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This paper extends organizational imprinting theory to
networks by examining how the social technology avail-
able during the establishment of community-based inter-
corporate networks continues to influence contemporary
network structures despite major changes in the U.S. cor-
porate environment. I examine the 51 largest U.S. com-
munity network systems in 1986, the same networks in
2000, and the network activity of the component organi-
zations of those network systems. Results show that even
when controlling for many plausible alternative explana-
tions, communities established prior to the advent of air
travel technology have preserved locally focused net-
works, which suggests that this pattern is maintained by
emulation of locally legitimate templates of action. This
research contributes to work on imprinting by extending
it to networks and in theorizing the social mechanisms
that result in the persistence of social forms. Further-
more, it contributes to work on directorship networks by
suggesting that the way information flows through this
network may be geographically contingent.•
Organizational scholars have done considerable work in
understanding how the past continues to influence the pre-
sent. According to Stinchcombe (1965: 142), “the groups,
institutions, laws, population characteristics, and sets of
social relations that form the environment” are historically
contingent and imprint an organization with the characteris-
tics of the era when it was founded. Stinchcombe (1965)
illustrated how this hypothesis was supported for unions, fra-
ternities, and savings banks, as well as many other types of
organizations and industries. More recent studies have exam-
ined how initial conditions affect outcomes such as organiza-
tional mortality in beer brewing and newspapers (Swami-
nathan, 1996), the organizational strategy of semiconductor
manufacturers (Boeker, 1988), personnel procedures in gov-
ernmental agencies (Meyer and Brown, 1977), and rates of
change in nonprofits (Tucker, Singh, and Meinhard, 1990).
Although there has been significant interest in the effect of
founding conditions on organizational outcomes, little atten-
tion has been given to how social and technical conditions at
the time of founding affect other social forms, such as net-
work structures, and the social mechanisms that maintain
historically imprinted patterns.
Researchers are beginning to recognize the persistence of
network structures. Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) noted a
path dependence in the biotechnology partner network, and
Uzzi and Spiro (2004) discovered that the pattern of connec-
tions among individuals associated with Broadway musicals
has maintained the same structure for over 90 years despite
tremendous changes in the industry and the place of musi-
cals in the entertainment market. Furthermore, the local
board of director and acquaintance network of corporations
and philanthropies in Minneapolis–St. Paul remained cohesive
in the 1980s despite the retirement of many key network
members (Galaskiewicz, 1997). The Minneapolis case is par-
ticularly intriguing because, while previous studies have indi-
cated that the directorship network was segmented into
regional groupings early in the twentieth century (Mizruchi,
1982) and in the 1960s (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Kono et
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al. 1998), it is not obvious why this pattern would be main-
tained, given the considerable turnover of U.S. corporations
(Navin, 1970; Davis and Stout, 1992; Mizruchi, Stearns, and
Marquis, 2004) and extensive changes in the economy and
business strategy of U.S. firms since the 1970s (Nohria,
Dyer, and Dalzell, 2002).
The modern intercorporate network was established at the
time of the “managerial revolution” that accompanied the
rise of major U.S. industrial corporations around the turn of
the twentieth century (Chandler, 1977). The most important
social technology at that time that influenced board of direc-
tor connections was the difficulty of intercity travel, and geo-
graphic communities established prior to the advent of air
travel should be more likely to maintain more locally focused
networks than more recently established communities.
Although it is logical that communities established early in
the century would have had locally based networks because
of the lack of effective transportation technology such as the
automobile and plane, since more recent periods were char-
acterized by the ease of intercity travel (Borchert, 1967), it is
not clear why these patterns would be maintained in modern
times. To examine how the historical factors present during
the formation of local directorship networks may have a per-
sistent effect on the network structure, I take a social-mecha-
nism-based approach (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Davis
and Marquis, 2005).
Stinchcombe (1991: 367) described a social mechanism as
“bits of theory about entities at a different level (e.g., individ-
uals) than the main entities being theorized (e.g., groups),
which serve to make the higher-level theory more supple,
more accurate, or more general.” To better understand the
higher-level imprinted director network system, one also
needs to examine the individual component organizations
within these systems to elucidate the processes by which
the imprinted pattern is maintained. Drawing on the social
network literature, I focus on two key social mechanisms
that would lead component organizations to replicate the
existing network structure: the importance of social institu-
tions as connecting mechanisms (Galaskiewicz, 1991; Saxen-
ian, 1994) and the emulation of locally legitimate templates of
action (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Davis and Greve, 1997). To
establish that an imprinted pattern exists, I analyzed the
board of director networks of 51 cities with the greatest
number of public company headquarters in 1986 and reexam-
ined this same sample of communities with data from 2000.
To explain how an imprinted pattern is maintained, I then
conducted organizational-level tests of organizations within
those communities to better understand the mechanisms
that lead to the maintenance of imprinted patterns.
IMPRINTING IN INTERCORPORATE COMMUNITY
NETWORKS
Prior work on intercorporate director networks has only
examined the largest U.S. firms. Looking at more recent
firms and a sample that comprises all U.S. corporations on
major stock exchanges, descriptive evidence indicates that
there is considerable variance in the distribution of local con-
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nections among major U.S. metropolises. For example, in the
data I analyze, in 2000, 36 percent of the directorship con-
nections of Minneapolis–St. Paul firms were with other Min-
neapolis–St. Paul firms, whereas for Denver this figure is only
5 percent. A comparison of the intercorporate community
networks of St. Louis, MO, and Phoenix, AZ, in 2000 pro-
vides a good example of how widely U.S. communities can
vary in the extent of their network connections. These two
corporate communities were very similar on many contempo-
rary characteristics, including the number of public compa-
nies (St. Louis had 59, and Phoenix had 52) and population in
2000 (St. Louis: 2,603,607; Phoenix: 3,251,876). A primary
difference, as reflected by 1910 population, is that St. Louis
was well established early in the century (a 1910 population
of 687,029), whereas Phoenix was more recently established
(a 1910 population of 11,134). The establishment of a locality
during a time when transportation was limited may have had
a lingering effect on the propensity of current corporations to
be locally tied to one another. Thus, in 2000, St. Louis had a
much higher percentage of local connections (31 percent)
than did Phoenix (13 percent). This difference is not simply
due to St. Louis having older companies. Although St. Louis
was established much earlier, as of 2000, 77 percent of com-
panies headquartered there have been founded since the
early 1970s, a percentage comparable to Phoenix, where 81
percent of companies have been founded since the early
1970s. Put another way, while communities like St. Louis
may be old, the companies in their intercorporate networks,
on average, are not. Air travel was exceptionally accessible
when the majority of companies in these communities were
established, and yet St. Louis continues to have a much
denser community-based intercorporate network. The pattern
displayed by St. Louis is also common for other communities
that were established in the early part of the century. Even
early-established communities that have undergone exten-
sive restructuring of their labor force and corporate communi-
ty (e.g., Cleveland and Pittsburgh) still maintain very locally
based networks. Given the considerable variance across local
networks of shared directors, it is clear that geographic fac-
tors are important to consider.
Stinchcombe (1965) reasoned that organizations founded dur-
ing the same historical period would have similar structural
characteristics because they faced the same environments
and challenges. A classic example is fraternities established
during common periods, which have similar goals and struc-
tures and have maintained historically specific features up to
the present, despite being founded over a century ago. The
organizational imprinting literature has described how the
founding conditions for an organization have lasting structural
influences and has focused on two different phenomena: (1)
the importance of founders and top management for the
future trajectory of individual organizations (e.g., Boeker,
1989; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Baron, Hannan,
and Burton, 1999) and (2) how the environment at founding,
particularly competitive conditions, influences cohorts of
organizations (e.g., Meyer and Brown, 1977; Boeker, 1988;
Swaminathan, 1996). The second category of studies argues
generally that the structures developed to meet the initial
657/ASQ, December 2003
Network Imprinting
#1611-ASQ V48 N4-Dec 2003—file: 48404-marquis
competitive conditions will still be apparent in contemporary
organizations.
While Stinchcombe (1965: 153) argued that it is the “social
technology available” that influences the “organizational
inventions that can be made at a particular time in history,”
most imprinting studies in the organizational literature have
focused on the effect of the founding characteristics of the
economic environment. This includes how the founding eco-
nomic environment influenced subsequent rates of change
(Tucker, Singh, and Meinhard, 1990), overall growth rates
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990), and organizational mor-
tality (Swaminathan, 1996). While economic forces are cer-
tainly an important influence on organizations, they are only a
small part of the environment Stinchcombe theorized (Louns-
bury and Ventresca, 2002).
A limited number of imprinting studies have considered the
influence of the broader social environment. Kimberly (1975)
described how the focus of sheltered workshops, a type of
rehabilitation organization, reflected either a production or
rehabilitation orientation depending on the dominant social
philosophy toward the handicapped during the organizations’
founding period. Meyer and Brown (1977) described how the
civil service movement and legislation influenced patterns of
bureaucracy in finance agencies. In a study of five Central
European countries in the decade following the transition
from communism to free markets, Kriauciunas (2004) demon-
strated that firms founded before and after the transition con-
tinued to use knowledge routines with different intensities.
Applying imprinting logic to a historical case study, Johnson
(2002) showed how the artistic and political conditions during
the creation of the Paris Opera structured its future organiza-
tional trajectory. These studies, which situate organizational
behavior within their broader historical and social context, are
examples of how Stinchcombe’s imprinting theory can help
researchers better understand the effect of environments on
organizations.
Local Network Connections
Although Stinchcombe is known for the insight that organiza-
tional structures maintain historical social influences, one of
his primary examples is not an organization but the set of his-
torical conditions resulting in the use of the craft system in
the contemporary construction industry. This system, in
which many suppliers are connected only for specific and lim-
ited projects, is essentially a network organization, like the
fashion district described by Uzzi (1997). As Stinchcombe
(1965: 153) described, the construction industry being orga-
nized around craft networks is a result of conditions at the
founding of the industry, including “dense settlement . . .
contracts enforceable in the law, free wage labor.” He point-
ed out that this system was pre-industrial and, despite much
subsequent technological and organizational advancement,
maintained the network structure that was imprinted during
its early establishment in densely populated European cities.
Just as the network connections that characterize the organi-
zation of the construction industry reflect development in
densely settled areas, the social structure of many early U.S.
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communities developed during a period when network con-
nections would be influenced by travel restrictions. Differ-
ences between when communities were established should
therefore predict how locally connected their interorganiza-
tional networks are today.
While scholars may not have explicitly studied the lingering
effect of founding conditions on network structures, they
have described how historical conditions influence network-
ing and have shown that network patterns, once established,
are remarkably persistent. Putnam (1993), in his study of
regional differences in implementing governmental programs,
concluded that the success of Northern Italy in comparison to
Southern Italy is a result of extensive civic networks in the
north. When contrasting the historical circumstances that led
to this difference, he described the revolution in governance
during medieval times that resulted in new leadership in both
regions. The south came under the control of the Normans,
who demanded supreme fealty to the king, resulting in a
society that focused connections on vertical relationships. In
the north, however, a looser governance structure emerged
that focused on horizontal associations. These associations
became institutionalized, and as Putnam (1993) argued, led to
the north’s success. According to Putnam, despite being
aware of the success of the north, the south wasn’t able to
emulate the north’s more successful style of social connec-
tions because it was constrained by historical conditions. The
persistence of network structures is also evident in the inter-
corporate network in Minneapolis–St. Paul, which maintained
a local orientation despite the retirement of many key net-
work members (Galaskiewicz, 1997). Furthermore, in a
recent study of the emergence of the Broadway musical
industry network, Uzzi and Spiro (2004) found that there is a
remarkable persistence of the network form that was set
down during the industry’s emergence. As they described,
despite thousands of new network members, a tremendous
amount of market changes (the advent of TV and talking
movies), and exogenous shocks (the Depression, and world
wars), the network structure has been maintained for 90
years. Similarly, work in the strategy literature has described
path dependence in the biotech network following its forma-
tion (Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997). A key difference
between path-dependence arguments and an imprinting
argument, however, is that a path-dependence perspective
focuses on general persistence; in an imprinting argument,
while persistence is important, equally important is how the
founding social conditions influence the social form.
The initial step in examining imprinting is to identify both the
founding date or period of the social form and the relevant
social technology at that time. Stinchcombe (1965: 154)
claimed that “the date of the (growth) spurts is highly corre-
lated with the present social structure.” The birth of the
modern intercorporate network dates from the “managerial
revolution” that accompanied the rapid transformation of the
corporate form around the turn of the twentieth century
(Chandler, 1977). Mills (1956) argued that the rise of industri-
alists around this time created a split in local social structure
as the “new” upper class came to compete against the
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“old” upper class. Identifying the importance of these
changes, historians and sociologists have demonstrated that
this corporate transformation created a qualitative change in
urban social structures around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, including, for example, the emergence of a new elite
social class in Detroit (Zunz, 1982) and the rise of business
citizenship in Cincinnati, reflecting a new elite social class
connected by locally overlapping networks of social clubs,
trade associations, and boards of directors (Haydu, 2002).
For the intercorporate community networks that were estab-
lished during the managerial revolution, arguably the most
important historical condition that influenced network struc-
ture was extremely limited travel and communication tech-
nology. Before the advent of air travel, getting from New York
to Chicago was a two-day trip (Chandler, 1977), which would
make intercity travel for board of directors meetings a
demanding proposition. Furthermore, contemporary urban
social structure was established prior to the beginning of the
era of auto and air travel in American metropolises (Borchert,
1967). Borchert (1967) argued that U.S. metropolitan evolu-
tion reflects transportation technology epochs. Urban physi-
cal and social structures have changed with the innovations
of the steam engine, electricity, and the internal combustion
engine. It is only in the period after 1920 that technology
enabled long-distance travel via car and plane, facilitating
intercity travel. As a result of the difficulty of intercity travel,
the intercorporate social networks of cities established in the
early part of the century were locally oriented (Mills, 1956;
Zunz, 1982; Hadyu, 2002).
The intercorporate networks of more recently established
cities were shaped when communication and transportation
issues were not as significant. Because board member choic-
es in these communities were not as bound by geographical
considerations, these cities are likely to have less locally con-
centrated networks. Although cities with different historical
legacies may appear to be similar at present on a wide array
of dimensions (including the number of public corporations,
current population, and types of companies headquartered
there), I expect that their networks will have much different
compositions as a result of the legacy of the period when
they were established.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The local intercorporate networks of communi-
ties that were established before the era of auto and air travel will
have a greater percentage of local network connections than cities
established more recently.
Stinchcombe (1965: 155) described the significance of
imprinting as the remarkable stability of “certain structural
characteristics . . . over time.” While it is likely that communi-
ty-based intercorporate networks were locally focused during
the period of their founding, the mechanisms that maintain
this imprint are not clear. Stinchcombe (1991) suggested that
the essential step of a social-mechanism-based approach is
examining a different level of analysis than the main theory.
For community networks, the behavior of the component
organizations of the community system are particularly impor-
tant to understand. The analog of this system-component dis-
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tinction for studies of organizational-level imprinting is to
study both the imprinted organizational system and the
behavior of individuals within the organizational system that
continues to replicate the imprinted pattern. There are two
primary mechanisms that may lead the component organiza-
tions within the community network systems to continue to
replicate the imprinted pattern: (1) the existence of local
social institutions that provide a venue for social connection
and (2) firms’ emulation of locally legitimate templates of
action.
Local Connecting Institutions
Previous research has shown the importance of local institu-
tions in replicating distinctive character in cities (Molotch,
Freudenberg, and Paulsen, 2000), maintaining local network-
ing culture (Saxenian, 1994), and, importantly for this paper,
in the persistence of local elite networks (Galaskiewicz,
1991). These arguments persuasively explain that institutional
linking devices are important for replicating local social struc-
tures, but those previous studies have highlighted the role
that these institutions play in maintaining rather than creating
the observed pattern. For example, Saxenian (1994) proposed
that the structural differences between the Route 128 region
and Silicon Valley were established well before the emer-
gence of technology firms in those areas. At the outset of
this industry in the 1950s, the different historical legacies of
these two regions were expressed in the way the major uni-
versities competed for early governmental funding. MIT, in
the Boston area, with a legacy of hierarchical organization,
looked to partner directly with large government agencies
and corporations. Silicon Valley did not have this experience,
so when Stanford University looked to compete for funds, it
looked to smaller firms, which necessitated collaborative rela-
tionships. Saxenian (1994) argued that these historical differ-
ences then became reinforced and institutionalized in Silicon
Valley in the 1970s with the rise of funding networks and var-
ious business associations.
Prior work on directorship networks has identified three pri-
mary social institutions that may contribute to persistence in
local network connections: exclusive upper-class clubs (Kono
et al., 1998), banks (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985), and local arts
and culture organizations (Ostrower, 2002). The general logic
of these arguments is that these venues provide a means for
local elites to interact repeatedly, which leads to a greater
propensity to select other local members for their corporate
boards. Having these institutions in a community would
therefore result in maintenance of the imprinted pattern.
Banks also have an important economic role in communities,
which makes their board seats attractive for local businesses.
A significant presence of these connecting institutions in
communities should lead to a greater likelihood of organiza-
tions establishing local connections, perpetuating the imprint-
ed pattern.
Upper-class clubs. Some theories of board of directors com-
position describe a social-class-based system of establishing
and maintaining directorship relationships. These theories
propose that inside directors seek fellow members they are
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able to trust and that the common socialization and interac-
tion of being a member of the upper class leads to that trust
(Useem, 1984; Domhoff, 1998). These social class explana-
tions focus on director-selection decisions as being driven by
elite cohesion and identify upper-class clubs as a primary
socialization institution for the upper class.
Given the elite status of members of public corporations’
boards of directors, the exclusive upper-class club would be a
significant connecting institution for this social group that
may lead to a greater likelihood of firms maintaining local
connections. Numerous studies have looked at the connec-
tion between upper-class-club memberships and network
connections at the individual level. They have shown that
upper-class-club members are more likely to hold director-
ships (Bonacich and Domhoff, 1981), and two or more direc-
tors are more likely to serve on the same board when both
are upper-class-club members (Johnson and Mintz, 1989).
This indicates that upper-class clubs and corporate director-
ships are both reinforcing mechanisms of upper-class cohe-
sion and that communities with upper-class clubs would be
more likely to sustain a dense intercorporate network. The
presence of exclusive local upper-class clubs has been
shown by Kono et al. (1998) to predict director relationships
at the firm level in the mid-1960s. These researchers found
support for the hypothesis that corporations in cities with
upper-class clubs are more likely to maintain local industrial
and financial directorship relationships. Following Domhoff
(1998) and Kono et al. (1998), I argue that there is an impor-
tant distinction between exclusive upper-class clubs and
more ordinary social clubs that exist within communities and
that as Kono et al. (1998) found of the mid-1960s, exclusive
upper-class clubs in communities leads to a greater likelihood
that individual organizations will establish local connections.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Organizations in communities with exclusive
upper-class clubs will be more likely to have local connections than
organizations in communities without exclusive upper-class clubs.
Bank presence. As Mintz and Schwartz (1985: 195–196)
noted, “Every serious study of a major metropolitan area has
discovered tight interlock networks with banks as the central
nodes.” Like upper-class clubs, banks’ boards of directors are
also an influential connecting mechanism of the elite
(Mizruchi, 1992). While banks have been seen as important
to the social cohesion of the upper class, the importance of
banks as a local connecting institution is based more on the
logic of economic and power dependence. Industrial firms
create board-of-directors connections with commercial banks
to influence lending, and financial institutions interlock with
industrials to gain information and access (see Baker, 1990,
on investment banks). As a result, commercial banks have
come to be at the center of both the national and local inter-
corporate networks.
An additional reason for banks’ centrality in local networks
may be the historical geographic restrictions on U.S. banking
activity (Roe, 1994). For much of U.S. history, banking has
been strictly limited to activity within each state, which is
reflected in director relationships. Mizruchi (1989), for
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instance, found that being in the same state predicted
whether 57 major corporations were connected indirectly
through financial intermediaries. More recent research has
indicated that although the national network centrality of
large money-center banks declined between 1982 and 1994,
the degree of banks’ local connections did not substantially
decline during this period (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). As an
example of this phenomenon, even as recently as 2003, the
second largest commercial bank in the United States, the
Bank of America, had 5 of its 14 outside director seats held
by residents of its home state of North Carolina. These direc-
tors represented Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Company, Gen-
eral Parts, Inc., Belk, Inc., Bassett Furniture Industries, and a
private individual who is chairperson of the C. D. Spangler
Foundation, a Charlotte, North Carolina, organization. That an
organization such as Bank of America, which has branches in
29 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and 31 foreign coun-
tries, continues to maintain such a locally oriented board indi-
cates the deep historical ties of commercial banks to their
headquarters community. Because of the localness typical of
U.S. bank boards of directors, it is likely that the more banks
that are headquartered in a community, the more local con-
nections there will be.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The greater the presence of commercial
banks in a community, the greater the likelihood that organizations
in that community will have local network connections.
Arts and culture organizations. Like exclusive upper-class
clubs and banks, nonprofits and their boards of directors are
an important influence on the degree of local elite cohesion.
In a study of Minneapolis, Galaskiewicz (1991, 1997) credited
the rich associational life, including nonprofits and other com-
munity associations, as being at least partially responsible for
how the social network that connected local organizations
was able to renew itself after the retirement of many key
network members. But not all nonprofit organizations are
equally important as connecting mechanisms of the local
elite. Arts and cultural organizations in particular have been
identified as the types of institutions that contribute the most
to local elite cohesion. DiMaggio and Useem (1978) main-
tained that high arts organizations and their boards unify the
local elite and set it apart. Ostrower (2002), who conducted
an in-depth qualitative study of four arts organizations in two
communities, suggested that most trustees of these organi-
zations are social elites and that while these institutions have
more recently begun appealing to the broader society, part of
their implicit mission is serving the elites’ interests. Findings
of a historical study of museum, hospital, and United Way
boards in Cleveland and Boston showed that arts board
members were more likely to have attended elite schools
and to be in social registers than were the United Way or
hospital board members (Abzug et al., 1993). Thus in terms
of the type of nonprofit organization most associated with
the cohesiveness of local networks, it is likely that arts and
culture organizations play the largest role.
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Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The greater the presence of arts and culture
organizations in a community, the greater the likelihood that organi-
zations in that community will have local network connections.
Locally Legitimate Templates of Action
While connecting institutions are important to understanding
how local elite members within a community interrelate,
boards of public companies are significant corporate symbols
that are actively managed for organizational legitimacy
(Selznick, 1957; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Consistent with
new institutional theory (Scott, 2001) and the many examples
of how members of social networks rely on geographically
proximate or prominent actors as models for action (e.g.,
Davis and Greve, 1997), it is plausible that new companies
would look to other local firms for the most appropriate board
design. Davis and Greve (1997) theorized how this would
happen for another corporate governance practice, the gold-
en parachute, explaining that differences in local norms may
influence governance practices. In their sample, the majority
of firms in Dallas adopted a parachute by 1983, indicating a
greater cultural legitimacy, while only one firm in San Jose
had adopted one by 1990. They stated that even without
direct connections between local firms, “executives in St.
Louis are likely to be particularly attuned to the practices of
Anheuser-Busch, a highly prominent local business” (p. 14).
In considering that direct connections between firms are not
necessary for practices to spread, Strang and Meyer (1993:
490) argued that “linkages may be cultural as well as relation-
al. That is, the cultural understanding that social entities
belong to a common social category constructs a tie
between them.” As an example, they note that educational
practices spread rapidly among American states with little or
no interdependence or connection among the actors. As sug-
gested in Davis and Greve (1997), categories of cultural iden-
tification such as co-location in a community create important
reference groups and are influential when an organization is
imitating a practice.
The importance of local culture, and in particular a local defin-
ition of legitimate action, may be particularly salient for the
newer organizations that enter these local networks and are
therefore ultimately responsible for any maintenance of the
imprint that may occur. Local communities are seen as partic-
ularly significant for smaller and newer firms (Aldrich, 1999;
Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001), and thus newer entrants
to these local social systems probably rely on local organiza-
tions for cues about what is appropriate. Similar to how the
network is a repository of information about appropriate part-
ners in alliances (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), community net-
works are likely to be repositories of information for new
entrants. This is consistent with Meyer and Rowan’s (1977)
argument that templates of action are a powerful force in the
reproduction of social structures. For instance, a newly public
firm, entering the St. Louis intercorporate network and
unsure of how to structure its first board, might look to other
more established St. Louis actors, such as Emerson Electric
(41 percent of board connections are with other St. Louis
firms) and Ralston Purina (63 percent of board connections
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are with other St. Louis firms). A new firm in Phoenix might
look to Dial Corporation (only 12 percent of board connec-
tions are with other Phoenix firms). Similar to the existence
of a “city tradition” that is reflected in denser connections
between local organizations and community social patterns
that are perpetuated through time (Molotch, Freudenberg,
and Paulsen, 2000), I argue that it is by this process of orga-
nizations, particularly newly established ones, emulating the
practices of other local organizations that the network imprint
is maintained.
The above argument postulates that because corporate
boards of directors are key symbols of legitimacy, it is likely
that firms look to other local firms when structuring their
board. New institutional theory would predict that industry
peers would be a source of appropriate behavior. Because of
the importance of local communities for smaller and newer
firms, however, the network of connections and behavior of
other more legitimate local firms will also be important tem-
plates of action. As a result, the locally imprinted pattern is
perpetuated over time.
The argument above suggests two hypotheses. First, as
Davis and Greve (1997) suggested, because there is variance
in the norms of different communities, in early-established
communities where a norm of local connection would have
developed, organizations will have a greater propensity to
connect locally, even when controlling for the institutional
factors described above. Second, in answering the question
of how this norm gets perpetuated over time, it is likely that
more visible and prominent firms serve as especially impor-
tant templates for newly established firms.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Controlling for local institutional presence and
organizational and community economic and social characteristics,
organizations in communities that were established before the era
of auto and air travel are more likely to form local intercorporate net-
work connections than are organizations in communities that were
established more recently.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Newly founded firms in communities in
which prominent firms have more locally focused networks are
more likely to establish local ties.
DATA AND METHODS
Units of Analysis and Sample
This study was conducted at two levels of analysis: the local
community network and the component organizations of the
community networks. I defined communities as U.S. Census
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). This is the most com-
monly used operationalization of a community, as MSAs are
designed to capture not just the traditional political bound-
aries of a city but how economically and socially integrated a
region is. The U.S. Census Bureau described these areas as
a “core area containing a large population nucleus, together
with adjacent communities having a high degree of economic
and social integration with that core” (www.census.gov/
population/www/estimates/aboutmetro.html). For example,
the Chicago MSA includes Cook County as well as eight
other counties that surround it.
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The sample of board of director members used to construct
the community networks was taken from a list of all NYSE
and NASDAQ National Market firms in 1986 and 2000 as
detailed in Compact D/SEC. I chose these two markets
because they are the primary national markets and include
the vast majority of actively traded public companies (organi-
zations on the other national markets, AMEX and NASDAQ
Over the Counter, are mostly peripheral). The 1986 board of
director sample was composed of the 33,282 directorships
associated with 3,415 corporations. For 2000, the sample
included 47,566 directorships associated with 5,623 corpora-
tions. From each of these datasets, I constructed subsam-
ples representing the 51 largest Metropolitan Statistical
Areas.1 Organizations were placed in MSAs based on corpo-
rate headquarters location. Of the 51 communities in 1986,
the mean number of headquartered firms was 47, the medi-
an was 30. The highest numbers were New York (234),
Chicago (149), and Los Angeles (134), and the lowest num-
bers were in San Antonio, TX, Greensboro, NC, New Orleans,
LA, and Salt Lake City, UT, each with 14. Tracking the same
51 communities in 2000, the mean number of headquartered
firms was 71, and the median was 44. The highest numbers
were in New York (269), San Jose, CA (259), and Boston
(216), and the lowest numbers were in Tulsa, OK (14), New
Orleans, LA (13), and Dayton, OH (13).
To understand the potential social mechanisms involved in
imprinting, I also examined the behavior of the component
organizations of the 51 networks in both 1986 and 2000. This
included 1,943 total firms in the 51 communities in 1986, and
3,009 total firms in 2000. Because of missing values, these
total samples were reduced to 1,898 and 2,964, respectively.
Additionally, to test H3b, on the role of prominent firms on
new entrants to these networks, I extracted a subsample
from the 2000 data of the 1,823 firms with complete data
that were founded between January 1, 1987, and August
2000.
Dependent Variables
Although many measures have been used to characterize
networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), because I was inter-
ested in differences in the prevalence of local network con-
nections at the community level, as a dependent measure in
the community network analysis, I examined the number of
direct connections between local companies compared with
the total number of direct network connections. While this is
not a standard network measure, I used it because standard
measures do not capture how locally focused a network is in
relation to total network connections. This measure also
enabled me to include neutral ties in my model. Board of
director ties are typically characterized along three dimen-
sions: received, sent, and neutral ties. A received tie is an
officer of a corporation sitting on the board of the focal com-
pany, e.g., the chief executive officer (CEO) of AT&T sitting
on the board of Citigroup is a received tie for Citigroup. A
sent tie is an officer of the focal company sitting on the
board of another company, e.g., the Citigroup CEO sitting on
the board of AT&T would be a sent tie from the perspective
of Citigroup. Neutral ties are connections made by someone
1
Initially, my goal was to extract a commu-
nity-based subsample representing the 50
largest community networks in the Unit-
ed States in 1986, but in 1986, more than
one community had 14 companies, the
cutoff point to be included in the top 50;
thus, the sample consists of 51 communi-
ties.
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For the organizational-level analyses, I followed Kono et al.
(1998) and focused only on local connections created by
directional ties. As Kono et al. (1998) explained, at the organi-
zational level, these are the most meaningful to understand
because they are consciously managed by firms. Further-
more, at the organizational level, neutral ties are more diffi-
cult to assess, since the individuals involved do not have a
primary affiliation with the connected firms (e.g., Walter
Mondale is not an officer of either Northwest Airlines or Unit-
ed Healthcare). Whereas Kono et al. (1998) examined both
sent and received ties, however, I decided to examine only
received ties (i.e., officers of other corporations that sit on
the board of the focal firm). These ties better capture the
logic of my argument that it is organization-level behavior that
corresponds to the imprinted pattern. Sent ties (in which an
officer of the focal firm sits on another board) are more
reflective of a decision of another firm and the individual offi-
cer invited to be on that firm’s board. I measured this depen-
dent variable as the count of the total received local ties for
each firm.
Independent Variables
Early establishment. To understand the establishment of
cities and how this relates to intercorporate network struc-
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who is not an officer of either of the connected corporations,
e.g., Walter Mondale sitting on the boards of Minneapolis-
based companies Northwest Airlines and United Healthcare.
There is some evidence that neutral connections are impor-
tant to understanding the cohesion of networks (Davis, Yoo,
and Baker, 2003), so it is important to consider them when
measuring how locally focused community networks are.
Figure 1 illustrates this measure. The gray circles represent
local companies, and the squares represent non-local compa-
nies. There are two fully local direct connections (A-C and A-
B), and eight total connections in the network (A-3, A-1, A-B,
A-C, A-2, B-4, D-2, and D-4). To represent the proportion of
local connections in this network, one would divide two by
eight and, as a result, get .25.
A
B
C D
Figure 1. Illustration of connections in a network.
1
2
4
3
= Local company
= Non-local company
ture, a key period is the early part of the twentieth century.
Historical records support the importance of this period in the
development of the intercorporate network. Chandler (1977)
suggested that it was in the period prior to World War I that
the modern business enterprise was established, with the
emergence of large business organizations and the profes-
sionalization of management, and Roy (1997) described the
years 1901–1904 as the peak of the corporate revolution.
Chandler (1977: 455) described this period of the birth of the
modern corporation and urban social structure, similar to
Stinchcombe’s (1965) “growth spurt,” as a period of funda-
mental change in organizations: “. . . a businessman of today
would find himself at home in the business world of 1910,
but the business world of 1840 would be a strange, archaic
and arcane place.” This time period witnessed the emer-
gence of the large corporation, and organizational elites rose
to community power and came to dominate local social life,
which resulted in the emergence of the modern elite social
structure. This transition to the new elite was noted by Mills
(1956) and by Haydu (2002: 1459–1460), who described this
occurring around the turn of the century in Cincinnati and
suggested that “there is evidence for the development of
wider solidarities and civic identities among proprietary capi-
talists in other cases, including Pittsburgh (Ingham 1978),
Wilmington (Hoffecker 1975), Providence (Gilkeson 1986) and
Harrisburg (Eggert 1993).” An important concomitant to the
establishment of the modern urban elite social structure is
the difficulty of intercity travel during the early 1900s. Not
until 1920 did American metropolises enter the era of auto
and air travel (Borchert, 1967).
In the urban studies literature, the population of 1910 is typi-
cally used as a proxy to operationalize the degree of early
business establishment in communities (Norton, 1979).
Because population growth prior to 1910 was mainly a result
of industrialization, the level of population at that time is a
useful measure of the degree of business establishment in a
community (Norton, 1979). For this study, however, I
attempted to measure the phenomenon more directly and
obtained a measure of the number of incorporated firms in
each city in 1905.2 These data are from the Census of Manu-
facturers for each state in 1905 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1906), the closest measurement to 1910 of this concept I
could find. This variable has a mean of 300 incorporated firms
per community and ranges from 2,797 incorporated firms in
New York, down to the bottom seven communities, which
were not included in these volumes and received a value of 0
(cities with populations of less than 8,000 were not included).
Because of extreme values, this variable was logged (+1).
Upper-class club. Following Kono et al. (1998), I used the
upper-class social club list established by Domhoff (1998) to
control for the level of local upper-class cohesion (see Kono
et al., note 2, for Domhoff’s process). These represent the
most exclusive upper-class clubs, which Kono et al. (1998)
found to be an important differentiator among communities.
These are different than the social clubs that exist in all cities
and represent the most exclusive meeting grounds of the
elite. Of the 51 cities in the sample, 23 have at least one
2
Following Norton, I also used the popula-
tion of 1910 as an alternative operational-
ization of this concept. These different
operationalizations are correlated at .94
and return quite similar results.
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upper-class club, and 28 do not have an upper-class club. I
used a dummy variable to indicate if a community had an
upper-class club or not.
Number of banks headquartered. The total number of banks
in each community was tabulated and included in the analy-
sis as a control. The number of banks was based on Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes associated with the orga-
nization in the Compact D/SEC database. These included 2-
digit SIC codes 60, 61, and 67. Because banks are typically
central in local networks, a greater number of banks will lead
to a more locally connected network. In 1986, the average
number of banks was 3.86, with the variable ranging from 0
(Dayton, OH; Ventura, CA; Nassau Suffolk, NY) to 12 (New
York), and in 2000, the average number of banks was 3.67,
with the variable ranging from 0 (Stamford, CT; Richmond,
VA; Ventura, CA; San Diego; Denver) to 16 (New York).
Because of extreme values, this variable was logged (+1).
Arts and culture organizations. A measure of arts and culture
nonprofit organizations was also included in the models. For
each community, I tabulated the total number of these orga-
nizations with more than $10,000,000 in assets. Examples of
these organizations are museums, symphonies, and operas.
The asset cutoff is a result of data limitations from the
source of the data: the National Center for Charitable Statis-
tics at the Urban Institute (www.nccs.urban.org). In 1986, the
mean number of these organizations was 1.7, ranging from
New York with 19, down to 19 communities with none. In
2000, the mean number of these organizations was 6.4; 10
cities had more than 10 and New York had the most, with 54.
Five of the cities had none. Because of extreme values, this
variable was logged (+1).
Prominent firm percent local connections. To understand the
role of the most prominent local firms in the replication of
these social structures, at the organizational level, I created a
variable that measured the percentage of local received con-
nections held by prominent firms. I operationalized prominent
firms based on the 75th percentile and higher of firms in
each community based on firm sales. Thus, this group repre-
sents the largest 25 percent of firms in each community. To
calculate the measure for this group in each community, I
summed the total number of received connections and divid-
ed this value by the total number of received connections.
Thus, this variable represents a community-level profile of
the propensity of prominent firms to create local connec-
tions. Because I used this variable only in analyses of newly
founded firms between 1987 and 2000, I measured this vari-
able in 1986 only. This variable has a mean of 33 percent,
ranging from 58 percent in Milwaukee to the following eight
communities whose prominent firms had no local connec-
tions: Oakland, CA; Miami, FL; Ventura, CA; Tampa, FL; Salt
Lake City, UT; Middlesex, NJ; Wilmington, DE; and Newark,
NJ.
Control Variables
I included two main types of control variables in the analysis:
(1) features of communities that are included in both the
community-network-level and organization-level analyses and
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(2) features of organizations that are only in the organization-
al-level analyses.
Important features of communities that may influence the
dependent variable include the size of the corporate commu-
nity and the potential supply of available directors (number of
companies headquartered), as well as information on the
types and concentration of the local companies. Measures
reflecting the percentage of local firms that engage in manu-
facturing (percentage manufacturing) or service (percentage
service) were also created and included in the analyses to
capture how concentrated communities are with respect to
those two important types of industries. Manufacturing firms
were defined as those within SIC groups 2 and 3, service
firms as those within SIC groups 7 and 8. I coded each firm
based on its SIC group and then calculated the percentage of
firms in a community that were manufacturing or service. So,
for example, in 1986, Boston had 115 firms, 62 manufactur-
ing and 24 service, so it had 54 percent manufacturing and
21 percent service. For 1986, percentage manufacturing
ranged from 75 percent to 6 percent (highest in Minneapolis,
MN; Dayton, OH; and San Jose, CA; lowest in Wilmington,
DE; Nashville, TN; Birmingham, AL), and percentage service
ranged from 31 percent to 0 percent (highest in Washington,
DC; Nashville, TN; San Francisco; lowest in Fort Worth, TX;
Greensboro, NC; Hartford, CT). For 2000, percentage manu-
facturing ranged from 60 percent to 8 percent (highest in
Cleveland, OH; Portland, OR; San Jose, CA; lowest in Wash-
ington, DC; Nashville, TN; New Orleans, LA), and percentage
service ranged from 55 percent to 4 percent (highest in
Nashville, TN; San Francisco; Seattle, WA; lowest in Greens-
boro, NC; Birmingham, AL; Wilmington, DE). To pick up
effects beyond those associated with different industries, I
also created an index of concentration for each community
based on the 2-digit SIC code. This measure is similar to a
Herfindahl index. I took the percentage of companies in each
community that were in each 2-digit SIC code and then calcu-
lated the sum of the squares of those percentages. This
assesses the overall industrial concentration of each commu-
nity. In 1986, the most concentrated communities were Ven-
tura, CA; San Jose, CA; and Tulsa, OK; least concentrated
were New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles; in 2000, the most
concentrated communities were San Francisco, San Jose,
CA; and Tulsa, OK; least concentrated were Philadelphia,
Chicago, and Dallas.
Other potentially relevant factors at the community level
include the relative age of firms and the distance between
communities. Because the community-level effects may be a
result of older companies in the earlier established communi-
ties, I constructed a measure of the percentage of firms in
the community that were established on a major stock
exchange prior to 1973 (percentage old). I used 1973 as the
cutoff for convenience reasons, because by this date, the
CRSP database contained both NYSE firms (it began tracking
July 2, 1962) and NASDAQ firms (it began tracking Decem-
ber 14, 1972). The first date in CRSP following the beginning
of tracking of these markets reflects the date of establish-
ment of a firm on the given exchange.3 For the 1986 analy-
3
This measure may be slightly biased
because firms that have changed
exchanges would appear to be founded
more recently. Any risk of this is very
slight, however, because virtually all
exchange changes are firms moving from
NASDAQ to NYSE (Rao, Davis, and Ward,
2001), and since this variable was opera-
tionalized as before and after 1973, only
NASDAQ firms that were founded on the
NASDAQ in the period between 1971
(when the NASDAQ exchange was
founded) and 1972 and switched to the
NYSE in 1973 or later would be mis-
coded.
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sis, approximately 77 percent of companies had been estab-
lished before 1973, with the variable ranging from 100 per-
cent (Birmingham, AL) to 50 percent (Stamford, CT). By
2000, the overall percentage had dropped to 27 percent, with
the variable ranging from 69 percent (Dayton, OH) to 6 per-
cent (San Antonio, TX). This dramatic drop between 1986 and
2000 reflects both the growth in the total number of public
companies and the turnover of corporations. Although the
fact that the vast majority of companies were established
recently may be a surprise, in fact it is consistent with previ-
ous accounts of the extensive and frequent turnover of large
corporations (e.g., Navin, 1970; Davis and Stout, 1992;
Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis, 2004). Furthermore, while
this measure may not seem to capture how “old” the com-
panies in a community are, any error or bias will be conserva-
tive with respect to the dependent variable because many of
the companies that were established prior to 1973 were very
likely established after the advent of air travel. Furthermore, a
variable indicating location in a community that is within 100
miles of another major U.S. community was included in the
analysis. Thirty-one of the 51 communities were within 100
miles of another. The 100-mile threshold was based on
examination of distances between the communities in the
sample and informally estimating the likelihood of travel
between cities. There was a cluster of communities around
80 to 90 miles from one another that seemed to be plausible
locations to travel for director meetings (e.g., Charlotte and
Greensboro, NC, are about 85 miles apart; Chicago and Mil-
waukee, WI, are about 90 miles apart; Washington, DC, and
Richmond, VA, are about 95 miles apart). This measure
included, for example, all communities in the northeastern
U.S. and northern California, as well as other communities
within 100 miles of another. If distance is a factor in deter-
mining directorships, communities that are closer to other
communities should have fewer local connections. For exam-
ple, Milwaukee firms may rely less on local connections
because they can recruit directors of Chicago companies.
As an additional control for upper-class cohesion, I created a
measure for the percentage of CEOs who attended an elite
college or university (elite schooling, list of schools from
Useem and Karabel, 1986). To construct this city-level mea-
sure, I took the 1989, 1991, and 1993 lists of the “Corporate
Elite” in Business Week magazine (1989, 1991, 1993). These
lists include the academic backgrounds and other characteris-
tics of the CEOs of the 1000 U.S. companies in the Business
Week 1000 (this list seems to have appeared annually only
from 1989 to 1993). After entering all three of these years
into a database, I had a list of the educational backgrounds of
1,663 separate individuals who at one point in the 1980s or
1990s were CEOs of one of the largest 1000 corporations in
the U.S. Then, for each city, I took the total number of CEOs
from elite schools and divided it by the total number of CEOs
from that community in the Business Week list to get a per-
centage of CEOs in each community who attended elite
schools. Because of degree-of-freedom issues, and since
there are other measures of upper-class cohesion in the com-
munity analysis, this variable was only included in the organi-
zational-level analyses. Across all 51 communities, there is a
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mean of about 17 percent of CEOs who attended elite col-
leges or universities. Many southern communities, e.g., San
Antonio, TX; Birmingham, AL; Oklahoma City, OK; Richmond,
VA; and New Orleans, LA, have no CEOs of major companies
from elite colleges. Boston, MA, Phoenix, AZ, Miami, OH,
Dayton, OH, and Ventura, CA all had over 30 percent of
CEOs who attended elite colleges.
At the organizational level, to operationalize the concept of
each organization potentially being part of an industrial dis-
trict, I created a measure of local constraint, based on each
company’s 2-digit SIC code, which was a sum of the number
of local companies that were in 2-digit SIC codes that had
input-output relationships with the focal company’s primary
SIC code. This measure was based on the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis’s input-output tables, which describe for the
entire U.S. economy the total value of inputs (supplies) and
outputs (sales) of each focal industry and the industry associ-
ated with those inputs and outputs. For 1986, I used the
1987 tables, and for 2000, I used the 1997 tables. These data
are available only at the industry level, and other scholars
have used various methods to extrapolate industry constraint
to describe firm-level relationships (Galaskiewicz et al., 1985;
Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 1986; Mizruchi, 1989). Because
I was interested in understanding how being in certain locali-
ties might influence a firm’s propensity to create local con-
nections, I tabulated for each firm the number of firms within
the community that were in 2-digit SIC codes that had input
or output relationships with that focal firm’s SIC code. As an
example, in the 2000 data, the community that had compa-
nies with the highest values in this measure was San Jose,
which is consistent with Saxenian’s (1994) characterization of
the dense connections among Silicon Valley firms. For
instance, within the San Jose MSA, 73 organizations had 2-
digit input-output relationships with Intel Corporation.
I also created indicator variables if the focal organization was
a manufacturing, service, or bank firm. These variables were
based on the same criteria as above (manufacturing firms:
SIC groups 2 and 3; service firms: SIC groups 7 and 8; and
bank firms: 2 digit SIC codes 60, 61, and 67). These variables
capture any differences between different types of firms in
the likelihood of creating a local tie. Of the 1,943 total firms
in the 1986 sample, 844 are manufacturing firms, 257 are
service firms, 197 are banking firms, and the remaining 645
are in none of these three categories. Of the 3,009 total
firms in the 2000 sample, 1,086 are manufacturing firms, 980
are service firms, 187 are banking firms, and the remaining
1,130 are in none of these three categories.
One important alternative reason why firms create local con-
nections is that their competitors and industry peers may
serve as an additional template of action. To control for how
firms may imitate their industry peers, I created a variable,
industry localness, that measures, for each firm’s 2-digit SIC
code, the extent to which firms in that SIC code create local
connections. This variable was measured as the percentage
of total connections in the group that were from local compa-
nies. So, for example, if all the firms in a certain SIC code
had a total of 1000 directorship connections, 300 of which
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were to firms within their own community, that SIC code
would have an industry localness of 30 percent.
At the organizational level, I controlled for the total number
on board of directors. Also, since board membership is more
prestigious for larger and better performing firms, I also con-
trolled for firm sales (total sales) and the relative profitability
of the firm, measured as the firm’s standardized (via z-score)
return on assets versus 2-digit SIC code peers.
Models
The dependent variable for the community network analysis
is a percentage, so I used Tobit regression to test hypothesis
1. Tobit, which corrects for situations in which the distribution
of the dependent variable is censored on either side, is
appropriate when the dependent variable is expressed as a
percentage, because the distribution is bound on the lower
end by 0 and on the upper end by 1 (Long, 1997).
Because the dependent variable in the organization-level
analyses is a count, I considered two primary ways to ana-
lyze these data. The traditional method, Poisson regression,
is appropriate when the mean and variance of the dependent
variable are similar. But when the variance is greater than the
mean (which is the case here), the data are considered
overdispersed, and negative binomial regression is the most
appropriate specification. For this analysis, I used the nega-
tive binomial regression program in Stata 7. A further issue
with these data is that not all observations are independent,
as community-level data are identical for all organizations in
each community. To correct for this, I used a random effects
model and specified the grouping variable as the community.
RESULTS
Tables 1–4 present the descriptive statistics and correlations
for the four sets of analyses (community-level and organiza-
tional-level analyses for both 1986 and 2000). Because there
are high correlations between some of the variables, there is
a potential for multicollinearity. There is no accepted method-
ology for treating this issue, though one way to make sure
that effects in the full model are not biased is to enter highly
correlated and substantive variables into the analyses sepa-
rately. I conducted additional analyses, not presented here,
adding each of the independent and highly correlated vari-
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Community-level Analysis, 1986
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10
01. Local connections 0.288 0.144
02. Early establishment 4.369 2.112 .534
03. Upper–class club 0.451 0.503 .477 .575
04. Number arts 0.645 0.718 .458 .581 .560
05. Number banks 1.430 0.578 .454 .487 .512 .616
06. Number HQs 3.556 0.721 .267 .355 .487 .641 .531
07. % Manufacturing 0.391 0.169 –.090 .006 .065 .042 –.312 .323
08. % Service 0.116 0.065 –.158 –.012 –.009 .236 .139 .407 –.074
09. % Old 0.765 0.097 .246 .220 .168 .183 .352 –.031 –.252 –.020
10. Concentration 1016.4 500.6 –.333 –.420 –.483 –.474 –.616 –.568 .106 –.187 –.087
11. Within 100 miles 0.608 0.493 –.365 –.164 –.241 –.116 –.213 .166 .277 .116 –.212 .069
ables separately to the base model, with no significant
change in magnitude or sign from the full models presented
here. Furthermore, multicollinearity does not influence model
fit, so having a statistically significant increase in model fit
corroborates the significance levels of the coefficients.
Results of the regression equations are presented in tables 5,
6, and 7. Table 5 includes all of the models at the community
level for 1986 and 2000. The results provide strong support
for H1, that earlier-established communities will have a
greater percentage of local network connections. For 1986,
model 1 presents a baseline model with controls. Model 2
presents the baseline model with the early-establishment
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Organizational-level Analysis, 1986
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08
01. Local connections .481 .855
02. Early establishment 5.21 2.093 .160
03. Upper–class club .667 .471 .160 .659
04. Number arts 1.115 .899 .102 .694 .627
05. Number banks 1.739 .648 .101 .638 .653 .796
06. Number HQs 4.158 .791 .026 .011 –.079 –.048 .690
07. % Manufacturing .428 .147 –.100 .086 .035 .337 –.266 –.173
08. % Service .133 .061 –.006 .316 .185 .516 .226 –.027 .178
09. % Old .767 .088 .102 .348 .321 .318 .386 –.213 .068 .168
10. Concentration 2.428 7.355 –.045 .181 –.024 .281 .390 .090 .448 .325
11. Within 100 miles .693 .461 –.078 .037 –.189 .071 .100 .323 .196 .277
12. Elite schooling .181 .091 –.061 .166 .019 .236 .110 .223 .380 .236
13. SIC local .397 .092 .143 .058 .026 .038 .074 –.123 .066 –.027
14. Number board 10.26 4.549 .385 .130 .082 .091 .126 –.152 –.040 .041
15. Sales 12.50 1.883 .242 .161 .010 .118 .126 –.065 –.061 .030
16. ROA –.001 .730 .068 .073 .039 .047 .060 .017 –.024 .031
17. Manufacturing firm .435 .496 –.088 .004 –.018 –.024 –.089 .298 –.055 –.027
18. Service firm .131 .338 –.069 .023 .013 .080 .060 –.026 .177 .170
19. Bank firm .101 .301 .261 –.024 –.028 –.042 .036 –.132 –.033 –.086
Variable .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 .18
10. Concentration .100
11. Within 100 miles –.146 .159
12. Elite schooling .005 .407 .287
13. SIC local .075 .054 –.025 –.014
14. Number board .142 .086 –.037 –.034 .187
15. Sales .114 .052 .034 –.003 .066 .556
16. ROA .046 .025 .015 –.027 .076 .079 .244
17. Manufacturing firm –.068 .012 .071 .051 –.442 –.215 –.098 .025
18. Service firm .032 .088 .084 .088 .186 –.104 –.134 –.036 –.341
19. Bank firm .066 –.041 –.105 –.049 .373 .405 .078 –.007 –.294 –.130
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Community-level Analysis, 2000
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09 .10
01. Local connections 0.188 0.095
02. Early establishment 4.369 2.112 .506
03. Upper–class club 0.451 0.503 .514 .575
04. Number arts 1.578 0.903 .403 .609 .594
05. Number banks 1.275 0.733 .342 .357 .260 .562
06. Number HQs 3.910 0.835 .329 .299 .474 .558 .628
07. % Manufacturing 0.338 0.128 .079 –.054 .131 –.069 –.126 .178
08. % Service 0.230 0.121 –.020 .119 .127 .073 .266 .556 –.153
09. % Old 0.267 0.125 .088 .218 –.032 .044 –.017 –.424 –.001 –.594
10. Concentration 1056.5 432.2 –.163 –.175 –.138 –.348 –.186 –.043 –.056 .294 –.321
11. Within 100 miles 0.608 0.493 –.159 –.164 –.241 .091 .096 .075 .049 –.031 .146 .036
variable included; it is statistically significant, and adding it
results in significant increase in model fit over the baseline
model, supporting H1. There were no predictions for the
institutional variables at the community level, but because
they are important controls, and to make the analyses more
comparable with the organizational-level analyses, I included
a model (model 3) that separately presents all of the institu-
tional variables: upper-class club, number of banks, and arts
and culture organizations. In this model, the arts and culture
organizations variable is only marginally significant, and the
overall model fit is only a marginal improvement over the
baseline. Model 4 includes all of the variables. In this model,
only the early-establishment variable is significant, further
confirming H1.
For the community-level analyses for 2000, model 5 is the
baseline model, and model 6 has the controls and early-
establishment variable. As for 1986, early establishment was
statistically significant, and this added significantly to the
overall model fit, indicating that for both 1986 and 2000,
early-established communities have more locally connected
networks. Model 7 contains the institutional variables with
the baseline, and in this model, the existence of an upper-
class club is significant. In model 8, the full model for the
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Organizational-level Analysis, 2000
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09
01. Local connections .349 .755
02. Early establishment 5.287 2.122 .068
03. Upper–class club .633 .482 .046 .645
04. Number arts 2.019 1.026 .029 .684 .619
05. Number banks 1.668 .761 .029 .512 .340 .710
06. Number HQs 4.607 .791 .040 –.178 –.122 –.373 .587
07. % Manufacturing .353 .129 –.085 .113 .031 .063 –.384 –.240
08. % Service .281 .113 .009 .012 –.118 –.058 .232 .216 .058
09. % Old .232 .105 .103 .272 .149 .260 .163 –.105 –.645 –.169
10. Concentration 6.772 21.18 –.034 .193 .015 .378 .004 –.239 .167 –.036 .149
11. Within 100 miles .683 .465 –.058 .066 –.215 .203 .323 –.328 –.042 .222 .001
12. Elite schooling .189 .091 –.090 .153 –.023 .207 .179 .009 .433 .147 –.280
13. SIC local .320 .076 .115 –.011 .000 .007 .011 –.082 –.114 .056 .096
14. Number on board 8.410 3.044 .184 .118 .063 .124 .096 –.128 –.184 –.086 .260
15. Sales 12.34 2.266 .170 .083 .034 .094 .039 –.071 –.245 –.019 .305
16. ROA .004 1.118 .010 .005 .020 .011 –.020 –.006 –.069 –.004 .068
17. Manufacturing firm .361 .480 .012 –.033 –.028 –.088 –.103 .269 –.073 .164 –.014
18. Service firm .327 .469 –.059 .025 .006 .008 .031 –.067 .141 –.136 –.092
19. Bank firm .062 .241 .059 .012 –.022 .033 .095 –.082 –.035 –.080 .075
20. Prominent % local* .331 .174 .068 .600 .683 .470 .396 .408 –.035 –.129 .304
Variable .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 .18 .19
11. Within 100 miles .118
12. Elite schooling .368 .359
13. SIC local –.022 –.079 –.099
14. Number on board .052 –.114 –.120 .169
15. Sales .013 –.140 –.137 .161 .505
16. ROA .030 –.050 –.033 .009 .056 .161
17. Manufacturing firm –.053 .017 –.004 .010 –.088 .046 .037
18. Service firm –.010 .044 .072 –.314 –.192 –.114 –.025 –.524
19. Bank firm .039 –.049 –.033 .163 .292 .043 .010 –.193 –.179
20. Prominent % local* .050 –.026 –.051 .025 .060 .033 .040 –.032 .008 –.008
* Descriptive statistics and correlations for this variable are based on the sample of 1,823 firms founded between
January 1987 and August 2000.
2000 community analysis, the early-establishment variable is
significant, and having an upper-class club is marginally signif-
icant. The key point to take away from these two sets of
analyses is that the effect of a historical imprint on local net-
working was consistent in both the 1986 and 2000 communi-
ty networks, giving full support to H1 and indicating that the
legacy of historical social structure leads to a greater likeli-
hood of current-day communities having locally connected
networks.
Table 6 presents the results of the organizational level analy-
ses for both 1986 and 2000. In this table, there is mixed and
inconsistent support for hypotheses 2a–2c, that different
institutional connecting mechanisms will influence local net-
working, and strong support for hypothesis 3a, that a geo-
graphically based template of action exists in community net-
works. Model 9 presents the baseline organizational-level
regression model for 1986, and model 10 includes the early-
establishment variable, which is significant and adds to the
overall model fit, giving support to H3a. Model 11 has all of
the institutional factors, and in this model, the upper-class-
club prediction (H2a) was supported, consistent with Kono et
al. (1998). In the full model for 1986, model 12, both the
early-establishment and upper-class-club variables maintain
significance, indicating that having an upper-class club is one
mechanism that leads to greater local connections and that,
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Table 5
Tobit Regression Results for Community-level Analyses, 1986 and 2000*
1986 Models 2000 Models
Variable .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08
Early establishment .024••• .020•• .018••• .016••
(.008) (.010) (.006) (.007)
Upper-class clubs .035 .008 .071•• .054••
(.043) (.043) (.032) (.032)
Number arts .047• .023 .000 –.020
(.033) (.034) (.021) (.022)
Number bank .009 –.001 .026 .023
(.050) (.048) (.023) (.022)
Number HQs .088•• .067•• .039 .052 .068••• .046•• .021 .027
(.035) (.033) (.045) (.044) (.019) (.019) (.029) (.028)
% Manufacturing –.111 –.113 –.078 –.104 –.042 –.011 –.002 –.015
(.119) (.111) (.135) (.130) (.099) (.092) (.104) (.100)
% Service –.782•• –.654•• –.674•• –.645•• –.159 –.210 –.120 –.212
(.293) (.276) (.300) (.300) (.144) (.135) (.139) (.140)
% Old .248 .156 .161 .139 .203 .033 .092 –.014
(.177) (.168) (.182) (.176) (.125) (.130) (.126) (.131)
Concentration –4.3E-05 1.7E-05 –2.6E-05 –1.6E-05 –2.0E-06 4.0E-08 –4.7E-06 –6.3E-05
(4.5E–05) (4.3E–05) (4.5E-05) (4.4E-05) (3.1E-05) (2.9E-05) (3.0E-05) (2.9E-05)
Within 100 miles –.096••• –.082•• –.074•• –.076•• –.049• –.028 –.025 –.012
(.035) (.033) (.036) (.035) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.025)
Constant .019 .011 .145 .067 –.050 –.011 .059 .059
(.191) (.178) (.195) (.192) (.098) (.091) (.102) (.098)
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
LR χ2 25.20 32.59 28.97 33.15 15.36 23.07 22.80 26.34
χ2 change 7.39••• 3.77• 7.95••• 7.71••• 7.44••• 10.98•••
Comparison model 1 1 1 5 5 5
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed for controls, one-tailed for hypothesized effects.
* The dependent variable is the percentage of all local connections (received, sent, and neutral) within the local net-
work system. Standard errors are in parentheses.
even controlling for institutional factors and other economic
and social controls, organizations in an early-established com-
munity continue to maintain locally focused ties, which points
to the existence of a geographically based template of action
in community networks.
For the organizational-level analyses in 2000, model 13 pre-
sents the baseline model, and model 14 presents the base-
line plus the early-establishment variable. Again, this variable
has a statistically significant effect and significantly adds to
the overall model fit, indicating support for H3a. In model 15,
which includes the institutional predictions in H2a–2c for
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Table 6
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results for Organization-level Analyses, 1986 and 2000*
1986 Models 2000 Models
Variable .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16
Community
Early establishment .107••• .087••• .052•• .073••
(.031) (.036) (.029) (.035)
Upper-class club .395••• .305•• –.009 –.114
(.139) (.131) (.142) (.146)
Number arts .170 .067 .004 –.057
(.108) (.102) (.083) (.085)
Number banks –.200 –.200 .149• .146•
(.176) (.162) (.107) (.104)
Number HQs .301••• .155• .132 .133 .197••• .128 .087 .096
(.090) (.082) (.133) (.115) (.072) (.079) (.121) (.116)
% Manufacturing .525 .706• .494 .612 1.066•• 1.164••• 1.39••• 1.336•••
(.434) (.380) (.496) (.470) (.418) (.411) (.487) (.472)
% Service –2.837••• –2.177•• –2.517•• –2.11•• .549 .440 .580 .239
(1.075) (.949) (1.038) (.944) (.642) (.639) (.665) (.675)
% Old .976 .320 .622 .283 1.683••• 1.125• 1.317•• .845
(.608) (.546) (.600) (.565) (.593) (.656) (.671) (.686)
Local constraint .001 –.002 –.001 –.004 .001 .001 .002 .001
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Within 100 miles –.250•• –.225•• –.107 –.129 –.186• –0.139 –.198• –.187
(.121) (.100) (.113) (.099) (.106) (.108) (.119) (.118)
Elite schooling –.547 –.812 –.646 –.973 –1.569••• –1.746••• –1.575•• –1.675•••
(.674) (.647) (.624) (.659) (.608) (.620) (.626) (.627)
Organization
Industry localness .971•• .920•• .955•• .909•• 1.863••• 1.878••• 1.859••• 1.867•••
(.458) (.460) (.458) (.460) (.461) (.461) (.462) (.463)
Number on board .064••• .064••• .063••• .063••• .057••• .056••• .057••• .055•••
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Sales .107••• .100••• .105••• .099••• .091••• .091••• .091••• .091•••
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020)
ROA .170• .162• .169•• .166• –.040 –.040 –.040 –.039
(.087) (.086) (.086) (.085) (.081) (.081) (.083) (.083)
Manufacturing firm .001 .000 .007 .006 .076 .069 .069 .061
(.092) (.092) (.092) (.092) (.097) (.097) (.097) (.098)
Service firm –.088 –.075 –.075 –.062 .027 .022 .025 .015
(.135) (.135) (.135) (.135) (.107) (.107) (.107) (.107)
Bank firm .439••• .438••• .456••• .458••• .119 .123 .098 .095
(.118) (.118) (.119) (.119) (.147) (.147) (.148) (.148)
Constant –1.948• –1.538• –1.142 –1.249 –3.934••• –3.738••• –3.705••• –3.674•••
(1.008) (.900) (1.026) (.908) (.516) (.518) (.564) (.550)
Observations 1898 1898 1898 1898 2964 2964 2964 2964
Number of groups 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Wald χ2 418.17 454.29 454.04 485.22 170.35 175.32 173.44 180.27
χ2 change 36.12••• 35.87••• 67.05••• 4.970•• 3.09 9.92•••
Comparison model 9 9 9 13 13 13
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed for controls, one-tailed for hypothesized effects.
* The dependent variable is a count of local received connections for each organization. Standard errors are in paren-
theses.
2000, none of the variables achieved even marginal signifi-
cance. Model 16 presents the full model for 2000, with both
the institutional and template predictions. In this model, the
early-establishment variable is significant, giving H3a full sup-
port, indicating that in both 1986 and 2000, even controlling
for institutional factors and other economic and social con-
trols, organizations in an early-established community contin-
ue to maintain locally focused ties. For the institutional pre-
dictions in H2a–2c, however, findings were not consistent
across both years of the analysis.
Table 7 presents the results of the organizational-level analy-
ses of newly founded firms between 1987 and 2000. This
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Table 7
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results for Organization-
level Analyses of Firms Founded, 1987–2000*
Variable Model 17
Community
Prominent firm % local 1.028••
(.472)
Upper-class club –.219
(.200)
Number arts –.051
(.103)
Number banks .005
(.129)
Number HQs .112
(.136)
% Manufacturing .456
(.598)
% Service .744
(.778)
% Old .475
(.871)
Local constraint .001
(.002)
Within 100 miles –.074
(.144)
Elite schooling –1.264•
(.762)
Organization
Industry localness 1.072
(.657)
Number on board .051•••
(.019)
Sales .062••
(.031)
ROA .134
(.244)
Manufacturing firm .021
(.142)
Service firm –.135
(.144)
Bank firm –.357
(.251)
Constant –2.486•••
(.742)
Observations 1823
Number of groups 51
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed for controls, one-tailed for hypoth-
esized effects.
* The dependent variable is a count of local received connections for each
organization. Standard errors are in parentheses.
table differs from the full models in table 6 in that in place of
the early-establishment variable, the key variable of interest
in this model is the degree of local connections made by
prominent firms within each community. This tests H3b,
which predicted that in addition to there being different local
norms of connection, newly founded firms looking to more
prominent local firms leads to the perpetuation of the pat-
tern. In this table, prominent firms’ percent local connections
is a statistically significant predictor, giving support to H3b
and indicating that newly founded firms look to prominent
local firms when establishing their boards of directors.
Some of the results of the control variables also merit atten-
tion. At the community level, the percentage of service firms
within a community was negatively significant in all of the
1986 models but not in 2000. This variable also was signifi-
cant in all of the 1986 organizational-level analysis but, again,
not in 2000. In the organizational-level analyses, perhaps not
surprisingly, industry localness, the percentage of local con-
nections of the focal companies’ industry, was a consistently
significant predictor. That there is isomorphism in local con-
nections for organizations in the same industry indicates that
while local firms are an important model, industry peers are
significant as well. This is an important finding because it pro-
vides further evidence that firms do emulate other firms’
board of directors templates. At the organizational level, the
number on the board and total sales also contributed to the
number of local connections in both years, and ROA con-
tributed in 1986 but not in 2000. Consistent with the changes
in banking industry directorship relationships described by
Davis and Mizruchi (1999), being a bank firm contributed to
local ties received in 1986 but not in 2000.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined how the social technology available dur-
ing the establishment of intercorporate community networks
continues to influence contemporary network structure and
behavior. The hypothesis on the existence of an imprint was
supported in both 1986 and 2000. Predictions that key con-
necting institutions would be influential in maintaining that
imprint, however, received only partial support. Predictions
about different locations having different legitimate templates
of action that lead new firms to emulate prominent local
firms received strong support, indicating that after the initial
imprint, local norms about what is the most appropriate
board design leads to the maintenance of this pattern. These
results indicate that the social path that community networks
take is affected by the historical legacy of the social technolo-
gy available at the time of network founding. This work con-
tributes to two areas, extending and further theorizing Stinch-
combe’s (1965) imprinting theory and creating a more
nuanced view of directorship relations. I consider each of
these more fully below.
The imprinting finding is not just the legacy of having the
same corporations, or types of corporations, in these com-
munities. Three-quarters of the network members entered
the 2000 network after 1973, so the difficulty of transporta-
tion could not have significantly influenced why they would
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continue to connect with local companies. Furthermore, an
analysis of the top 500 companies in 1917 indicates that the
vast majority of these companies no longer existed in 1967
(Navin, 1970). Additionally, 80 of the largest 200 U.S. manu-
facturing companies in 1955 had disappeared by 1994
(Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis, 2004), and approximately
one-third of the Fortune 500 in 1980 was no longer in the list
in 1990 (Davis and Stout, 1992). Thus, while large U.S. com-
panies may appear to have an air of permanence, contrary to
what one might expect, significant turnover of corporations
has occurred since the establishment of these networks.
Post hoc analyses further confirmed that these findings are
not an effect of organizational age. Because of the data limi-
tations on determining each organization’s age, as discussed
in the methods section, I was not able to run the full models
with organizational age as a control variable. Table 8, howev-
er, has the 2000 regression analyses using the subsample of
firms for which age data are available.4 This consists of the
approximately 2,200 firms in these communities that have
been established since 1973, the date when electronic data
became available for both the NYSE and NASDAQ. In this
analysis, the age coefficient is not significant, and the early-
establishment variable is significant at the p = .023 level.
An additional important factor that strengthens the imprinting
findings is that these results stand up even in spite of the
tremendous changes in U.S. industry that have occurred over
the past 30 years. Historical evidence based on the largest
U.S. corporations indicates that there has been a dramatic
shift in the U.S. economy since the mid-1970s, represented
by movement away from manufacturing to more service-ori-
ented businesses, such as retail, health care, telecommunica-
tions, financial services, and information technology (Nohria,
Dyer, and Dalzell, 2002). To confirm that the finding of local-
ness is not just an effect of the recent period but has existed
since the imprint, it is important to test for these same
effects on a sample of communities prior to the mid-1970s.
Director network data are difficult to collect, so for conve-
nience reasons, as a post hoc test, I conducted an analysis
on the 1964 director sample collected by the MACNET group
at SUNY Stony Brook (see Atwood et al., 1985, for a descrip-
tion of the sample and data collection procedures). This
dataset only contains information on the approximately 1,100
largest firms of the period, so as my sample, I examined the
18 communities that had over 10 headquarters. Headquarters
information for the firms was gathered from the 1965
Moody’s Industrial Manual. At the community level, I again
used the percentage of local connections as my dependent
variable. As my independent variables, I used early establish-
ment, existence of an upper-class club, percent manufactur-
ing (Fortune categories industrial and merchandizing), percent
financial (Fortune category banks and life insurance), number
of headquarters and within 100 miles.
As shown in table 9, early establishment continues to influ-
ence local connections, and, confirming Kono et al.’s (1998)
findings, having an upper-class club also influences local
directorship connections. Furthermore, the variables percent-
age financial and percentage manufacturing were significantly
4
Note that this is not the official age for
the firm but reflects the date when the
firm had its initial public offering (IPO) and
became a public company. Although only
having the IPO age may be seen as a
potential limitation, it is at the IPO that
firms typically begin inviting outsiders
onto their boards. Because of the pres-
sures of public listing, and scrutiny on
firms by investors, it is likely that this is
the point at which a firm would be most
cognizant of the legitimacy issues that I
have argued are important in understand-
ing why the network imprint is main-
tained.
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positive. Thus, I can conclude that the effect of early-estab-
lished cities being more locally connected is not a function of
the recent period and that this pattern is quite persistent.
Contributions to Imprinting Theory
This paper contains two important contributions to imprinting
theory. First, my findings indicate that historically imprinted
patterns have an influence on social forms beyond organiza-
tions. Second, unlike other imprinting work, I analyzed both
the imprinted system and the components of the system
that are responsible for maintaining the structure. The exten-
sion of imprinting theory to other social forms such as net-
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Table 8
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression Results Organization-
level Analyses, 2000 including Age*
Variable Model 18
Community variables
Early establishment .075••
(.037)
Upper-class club –.150
(.162)
Number arts –.112
(.092)
Number banks .036
(.115)
Number HQs .248••
(.124)
% Manufacturing .332
(.541)
% Service .411
(.746)
Local constraint .346
(.830)
% Old .000
(.002)
Within 100 miles –.118
(.133)
Elite schooling –1.912••
(.754)
Organizational variables
Industry localness 1.228••
(.601)
Number on board .053•••
(.016)
Sales .080•••
(.028)
ROA .018
(.228)
Manufacturing firm .086
(.128)
Service firm –.137
(.134)
Bank firm .122
(.189)
Organizational age .000
(.008)
Constant –3.174•••
(.673)
Observations 2181
Number of groups 51
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed for controls, one-tailed for hypoth-
esized effects.
* The dependent variable is a count of local received connections for each
organization. Standard errors are in parentheses.
works is an important addition to the imprinting literature
and, more generally, to all theory that considers historical
influences. Other theorists have indicated that there is path
dependence after a technology or practice locks in (e.g.,
Arthur, 1994) or that history has a pattern of cycles or waves
(e.g., Abrahamson, 1997; Schlesinger, 1999). The unique
aspect of Stinchcombe’s theory, however, is that founding
conditions continue to have an effect on future social struc-
tures. So extending this theory beyond its current domain in
organizations indicates that many other features of society
may have some yet uncovered “DNA” that can help explain
their operation and behavior. Furthermore, these findings add
to the role of history in network theory. While recent investi-
gators have described the persistence of network structures
(Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997; Uzzi and Spiro, 2004), no
one has examined either why this persistence occurs or how
network structures reflect the social conditions at founding.
This paper, then, both contributes to a growing work on net-
work persistence and pushes investigators in new directions
to understand how structures reflect founding environments.
While these findings have implications for the role of found-
ing conditions in understanding society, the main contribution
to imprinting theory per se is the attempt to elucidate and
test some of the social mechanisms that result in the perpet-
uation of patterns. I postulated two mechanisms, social insti-
tutions and locally legitimate templates of action. I found very
limited support for predictions for the three social institutions
but strong support for the mechanism of locally legitimate
templates of action. I hypothesized that each locality had dif-
ferent norms about the degree of localness and that even
controlling for many other organizational and community fac-
tors, being in a locale that was established early would lead
organizations to establish more local connections. In consid-
ering how this norm is perpetuated over time, I hypothesized
that newly founded members to the network systems would
look to the pattern of prominent local firms. Both of these
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Table 9
Tobit Regression Results for Community-level Analyses, 1964*
Variable Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22
Early establishment .103•• .094•••
(.046) (.034)
Upper-class club .403••• .390•••
(.112) (.099)
% Manufacturing .591• .262 .773••• .463•
(.326) (.328) (.256) (.251)
% Financial 2.396••• 1.751•• 1.77•• 1.29••
(.708) (.708) (.604) (.541)
Number HQs .106•• –.003 .011 –.073
(.052) (.064) (.047) (.050)
Within 100 miles –.133•• –.136• –.032 –.043
(.078) (.069) (.064) (.054)
Constant –.696•• –.670••• –.802••• –.807•••
(.330) (.303) (.271) (.230)
LR χ2 14.27 18.99•• 24.59••• 31.29•••
χ2 change 4.72 10.32 16.02
Comparison model 18 18 18
Observations 18 18 18 18
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; two-tailed for controls, one-tailed for hypothesized effects.
* The dependent variable is the percentage of local connections. Standard errors are in parentheses.
hypotheses were supported, which indicates that an impor-
tant way that historically based patterns are maintained is by
existing norms and emulation of these norms by new
entrants to social systems. These findings complement one
another, but neither is sufficient to make a strong case for
local emulation, since for the overall network pattern to be
maintained, new firms have to respond to the pattern and
existing firms must continue selecting local members when
filling board vacancies. Previous studies have found that
there is a low rate of reconstitution of directorship ties with
the same firm (Palmer, 1983), so existing firms continuing to
have locally staffed boards indicates that firms in early-estab-
lished communities likely have a different way of conceptual-
izing the available pool of directors than firms in other com-
munities.
A potential criticism of the analyses that examine the role of
prominent firms in maintaining the pattern is that, unlike the
other analyses, they were not carried out over multiple time
periods, so the findings may represent a cohort or period
effect. There are a number of reasons why this may not be
true. First, theoretically, given that the effect of prominent
firms on the behavior of others is a well-established tenet of
new institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), any
cohort or period effect would have to be at least partially
reflected in the cohort of prominent firms in 1986, since the
new entrants are looking to these local others when estab-
lishing their boards. Second, since the 1964 analysis is of
only the approximately 1,100 largest U.S. companies, it can
also be considered to reflect prominent firms, so the findings
corroborate the 1986 pattern. It is also unlikely that there is
something historically specific to the cohort of new entrants
to the system between 1987 and 2000. While it is true that
this is just one period, these firms were founded in the most
recent historical period, when travel and communication are
quite commonplace, and there is therefore no technological
reason why they would continue to maintain local ties.
My analyses indicate that in the context of community net-
works, the period of founding influenced local norms and cul-
ture, which were perpetuated by new entrants following the
example of prominent firms. While these arguments were
derived from the network literature, at a more abstract level,
they can be extended to overall imprinting theory. For exam-
ple, Baron, Hannan, and Burton (1999: 531) measured
founders’ mental models and found a relationship between
the degree of a founder’s bureaucratic model and firms’ lev-
els of managers and administrators, which they described as
follows: “the founder’s blueprint likely ‘locks in’ the adoption
of particular structures; it also ‘locks in’ certain premises that
guide decision making.” A potentially interesting extension of
that work that takes more of a social mechanisms approach
and maps onto the institutions and templates I theorized
would be to study how and which “particular structures” and
“certain premises” actually lead to the maintenance of these
organizational patterns. Or, put another way, what institutions
and legitimate templates of action are responsible for the
“lock in?” For example, did some founders create a greater
number of separate offices or departments, more layers in
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the reporting structures, have a greater investment in physi-
cal facilities, establish different spans of control? And which
of these, if any, influenced the persistence of the observed
pattern? Furthermore, what templates of legitimate action
were established through speeches, company vision or mis-
sion statements, or even hiring practices? And again, which
of these, if any, influenced the persistence of the observed
pattern? While this is just an example, it illustrates that the
next stage in work on organizational imprinting may be to
uncover the social mechanisms that led to the maintenance
of historically imprinted patterns and, as in this study, two
important mechanisms may be institutional structures and
legitimate templates of action.
Contributions to Work on Director Networks
This paper also contributes to the literature on board of direc-
tor networks, a context that has been shown to be influential
in a myriad of corporate behaviors, including intercorporate
control (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985) and how practices are
spread among the corporate elite (Davis, 1991; Haunschild,
1993; see Mizruchi, 1996, for a review). First, my findings
contribute to understanding the role of banks in these net-
works. There is substantial evidence of the important role of
banks as local connectors in the 1960s (Mintz and Schwartz,
1985). While Davis and Mizruchi (1999) showed that the
national influence of money center banks waned between
1982 and 1994, they pointed out that banks still appear to be
important to more localized networks. My results generally
corroborate Davis and Mizruchi’s (1999) findings that there
has been a change in the role of banks since the 1980s. At
the organizational level, being a banking firm positively influ-
enced local received connections in 1986, but by 2000, there
was no relationship. Contrary to what they and others sug-
gest about the local nature of bank ties, however, the pres-
ence of banks in a community was not statistically significant
in the majority of the models, and only marginally significant
in the 2000 organizational-level analyses. Thus, even though
banks as individual firms may have a more local pattern of
connections, it is not clear that this would be enough to
change the overall local network structure. Future
researchers may want to examine the differing importance of
both money center and regional banks to local and national
networks more systematically.
Second, the results of this study contribute to the debate in
the directorship network literature about the extent to which
interlock ties reflect individual intraclass connections or firm-
level interorganizational relationships. Recent scholarship has
indicated that social class membership and upper-class back-
ground more generally has an influence on corporate behav-
iors such as diversifying acquisitions (Palmer and Barber,
2001). Work by Palmer and colleagues (e.g., Friedland and
Palmer, 1984; Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, 1986; Kono et al.,
1998) on interlocks indicates that there is intraclass cohesion,
as does Mizruchi’s (1989) finding that there are localized pat-
terns of corporate political donations. In my study, at the
community level, the existence of upper-class clubs was a
significant predictor in the 1986 organizational-level analysis
and 2000 community analysis, as well as the post hoc 1964
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community-level analysis. These different results in the two
levels of analysis may relate to the difference between hav-
ing all tie types in the community-level of analysis and only
received ties in the organizational-level analysis. As Davis,
Yoo, and Baker (2003) said, neutral ties may be most impor-
tant to network cohesion. Given that neutral directors are fre-
quently not associated with a specific organization, and thus
are not recruited to mitigate constraint or establish an inter-
corporate relationship, it is possible that these ties reflect
upper-class connections instead. Thus, even if the class-
based system of establishing local connections has faded
over time, analyses that include neutral connections may
have a lingering class effect (e.g., the effect still being pre-
sent in the 2000 community network analyses). When look-
ing just at received connections, as in my organization-level
analyses, this upper-class effect may be important only in the
earlier period, 1986. Again, the results in this paper are not
enough to rule out either account, and future researchers
may want to examine the continuing role of social elites in
communities during this period more systematically.
Finally, the largest potential contribution of this work to the
directorship literature may be what it adds to understanding
the different contingencies under which directorship connec-
tions matter as sources of information. Others have
described a geographically contingent effect of interlocks, but
in relation to their use as a means of intercorporate control.
As Palmer, Friedland, and Singh (1986: 794) stated, “Direc-
tors who maintain intraclass bonds with one another by
virtue of their common residence in elite neighborhoods and
memberships in social clubs and policy making groups need
not sit on one another’s boards in order to facilitate coordina-
tion between the firms they command.” While this quotation
is about intercorporate control, viewed from the perspective
of Haunschild and Beckman’s (1998) work, geographic co-
location may be an important means of information substitu-
tion that could temper the role of these networks in the
spread of practices. For example, Haunschild and Beckman
(1998) found that CEOs’ membership in major business asso-
ciations reduced the influence of interlocks. But, as the
Palmer, Friedland, and Singh, (1986) quote above indicated
and Davis and Greve’s (1997) finding with respect to golden
parachutes suggested, geographic co-location may play an
important role in how information is spread. In particular,
given that all corporations are situated within geographic
locales, if information substitution operates through this
channel, Kono et al.’s (1998: 863) contention that “previous
interlock research which ignores spatial considerations is seri-
ously misspecified” may need to be investigated more fully.
My findings, which suggest that the effect of geographic
influence on the interlock network may vary depending on
the historical circumstances of individual communities, is one
step in that direction. Future investigators may want to tie
this geographically based heterogeneity to the diffusion of
information more explicitly. An additional potential area of
future investigation may be how local and non-local relation-
ships are related to structural holes (Burt, 1992). For
instance, if one assumes that more local connections lead to
685/ASQ, December 2003
Network Imprinting
#1611-ASQ V48 N4-Dec 2003—file: 48404-marquis
Abrahamson, E.
1997 “The emergence and preva-
lence of employee manage-
ment rhetorics: The effects of
long waves, labor unions, and
turnover, 1875–1992.” Acade-
my of Management Journal,
40: 491–533.
Abzug, R., P. DiMaggio, B. Gray,
M. Useem, and C. H. Kang
1993 “Variations in trusteeship:
Cases from Boston and
Cleveland.” Voluntas, 4:
271–300.
Aldrich, H.
1999 Organizations Evolving. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Arthur, B.
1994 Increasing Returns and Path
Dependence in the Economy.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Atwood, W. J., P. Beardon, P.
Freitag, C. Hendricks, P. Mariolis,
B. Mintz, M. Mizruchi, D. Palmer,
and M. Schwartz
1985 “Data collection and analysis
for the mathematical analysis
of corporate networks.” In B.
Mintz and M. Schwartz (eds.),
The Power Structure of Amer-
ican Business: 255–277.
Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press.
Baker, W. E.
1990 “Market networks and corpo-
rate behavior.” American
Journal of Sociology, 96:
589–625.
Baltzell, E. D.
1958 Philadelphia Gentlemen: The
Making of a National Upper
Class. Glencoe, IL: Free
Press.
Baron, J. N., M. T. Hannan, and D.
Burton
1999 “Building the iron cage:
Determinants of managerial
intensity in the early years of
organizations.” American
Sociological Review, 64:
527–547.
Boeker, W.
1988 “Entrepreneurial and environ-
mental imprinting at time of
founding.” In G. R. Carroll
(ed.), Ecological Models of
Organizations: 33–51. Cam-
bridge, MA: Ballinger.
1989 “Strategic change: The
effects of founding and histo-
ry.” Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 32: 489–515.
Bonicich, P., and G. W. Domhoff
1981 “Latent classes and group
membership.” Social Net-
works, 3: 175–196.
Borchert, J. R.
1967 “American metropolitan evo-
lution.” Geographical Review,
57: 301–332.
Burt, R.
1992 Structural Holes: The Social
Structure of Competition.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Business Week
1989 “The corporate elite.” Octo-
ber 20 (special issue).
1991 “The corporate elite.”
November 25: 185–216.
1993 “The corporate elite.” Octo-
ber 11: 66–106.
Chandler, A. D., Jr.
1977 The Visible Hand: The Man-
agerial Revolution in Ameri-
can Business. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
Davis, G. F.
1991 “Agents without principles?
The spread of the poison pill
through the intercorporate
network.” Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly, 36: 583–613.
Davis, G. F., and H. R. Greve
1997 “Corporate elite networks
and governance changes in
the 1980s.” American Journal
of Sociology, 103: 1–37.
Davis, G. F., and C. Marquis
2005 “Prospects for theory about
organizations in the early 21st
century: Institutional fields
and mechanisms.” Organiza-
tion Science (forthcoming).
686/ASQ, December 2003
#1611-ASQ V48 N4-Dec 2003—file: 48404-marquis
greater redundancies of information, having greater extra-
local connections may be an advantage to a firm.
Beyond a contribution to theory, and to understanding the
historical determinants of directorship relationships, this set
of findings is important because the network connections of
communities influence the overall community’s well-being
(Galaskiewicz, 1997; Putnam, 2000). These results provide
insight into community life in America as well and explain
some of the differences in community social capital (Putnam,
2000) that have not yet been explored. A long tradition of
analysis has examined the role of elites in community life
(Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Baltzell, 1958; Domhoff, 1998),
and much of this analysis has found elite networks to be
exclusionary. Recent research (Putnam, 2000), however, has
suggested that greater social cohesion among community
members will lead to a more prosperous community. Extend-
ing Putnam’s (2000) argument to local intercorporate net-
works, understanding the determinants of elite networks will
lead to a better general understanding of communities and of
the connection between corporations and community social
capital. Future researchers may want to examine how histori-
cal differences in communities and local networks have an
impact on other aspects of social and community life.
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